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Free Market of Crowdsourcing: Incentive
Mechanism Design for Mobile Sensing
Xinglin Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, Zheng Yang,Member, IEEE, Zimu Zhou, Student Member, IEEE,
Haibin Cai, Lei Chen,Member, IEEE, and Xiangyang Li, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various
functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low
participation level of smartphone users due to various resource consumptions, such as time and power, remains a hurdle that prevents
the enjoyment brought by sensing applications. Recently, some researchers have done pioneer works in motivating users to contribute
their resources by designing incentive mechanisms, which are able to provide certain rewards for participation. However, none of these
works considered smartphone users’ nature of opportunistically occurring in the area of interest. Specifically, for a general smartphone
sensing application, the platform would distribute tasks to each user on her arrival and has to make an immediate decision according to
the user’s reply. To accommodate this general setting, we design three online incentive mechanisms, named TBA, TOIM and TOIM-
AD, based on online reverse auction. TBA is designed to pursue platform utility maximization, while TOIM and TOIM-AD achieve the
crucial property of truthfulness. All mechanisms possess the desired properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, and
profitability. Besides, they are highly competitive compared to the optimal offline solution. The extensive simulation results reveal the
impact of the key parameters and show good approximation to the state-of-the-art offline mechanism.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, incentive mechanism, mobile sensing
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
THE market of smartphones has proliferated rapidly inrecent years and continues to expand. According to the
International Data Corporation (IDC) World-wide Quar-
terly Mobile Phone Tracker, 216:2 million smartphones are
shipped in the first quarter of 2013 [1]. IDC expects that the
smartphone shipments will grow by nearly 15:8 percent
and approach 63 percent of device shipments in 2016 [2].
The era of smartphones brings more than just quan-
tity. Today’s hand-held devices possess powerful compu-
tation and communication capability, and are equipped
with various functional built-in sensors. Along with users
round-the-clock, mobile phones have become an impor-
tant information interface between users and environ-
ments. These advances enable and stimulate the
development of smartphone-based sensing technologies
[3], [4]. Highlighting the participation of smartphone
users, this paradigm falls into the scope of participatory
sensing, which has attracted many research efforts in the
field of mobile and pervasive computing.
Participatory sensing emphasizes the involvement of a
large amount of participants in the process of sensing and
documenting where they live, work, and play. By synthe-
sizing ample information including images, sounds, mobi-
lities, locations, and travel records, it is possible to reveal
hidden habits and patterns in one’s life or public behavior
related to health, safety, social dynamics, and cultural
identity. In this sense, participatory sensing opens a win-
dow onto life and society that allows one to reflect on,
evaluate, and perhaps change patterns that were previ-
ously overlooked. Pioneer works include VTrack [5] and
SignalGuru [6] for traffic monitoring, NoiseTube [7] for
noise monitoring, SmartTrace [8], CityExplorer [9], Sen-
sorly [10] for 3G/WiFi discovery, Co-evolution model [11]
for behavior and relationship discovery, Frequent Trajec-
tory Pattern Mining [12] for activity monitoring, LiFS [13]
for indoor localization, crowd-participated system [37] Q1for
bus arrival time prediction, etc.
In most of the above-mentioned applications, a smart-
phone user is moving and sensing opportunistically in the
area of interest. Therefore, users may exhibit temporal
variations in replying the sensing tasks. For example, in
Pothole Patrol [14], the system tries to detect surface con-
ditions of roads by assigning tasks to participating
vehicles that pass by the roads one by one stochastically.
Similarly, in [15], The noise mapping system publishes
tasks to sequentially occurring smartphone users. In sum-
mary, participatory sensing applications reflect the essen-
tial and unique mobile nature of smartphone users.
The power of participatory sensing relies on the quality
and quantity of its participants, yet it is simply over-optimis-
tic to envision a planet-wide sensing platform at hand. The
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main hurdle lies in the lack of efficient incentive mecha-
nisms. More concretely, in existing works, the participants
are researchers or volunteers, and thus their willingness of
participation is not an issue at all. When extending partici-
pants from professionals to ordinary individuals, however,
the assurance of their willingness of contribution is indeed a
critical problem. The employed smartphones to sense the
environment will consume their own resources of computa-
tion, communication, and energy. Therefore, it is natural that
users will not participate in the sensing task, unless they are
sufficiently motivated. That is, the scale of participatory
sensing will not reach large, hence departing from its origi-
nal imagination, without effective incentivemechanisms.
The mobile nature of these distributed computation and
sensing powers further complicates the incentive mecha-
nism design. In brief, it is common in practical mobile sens-
ing that users are coming and bidding for a specific task
sequentially, and the decision on accepting or denying a
user’s bid must be made by the platform instantly
upon the user’s arrival, as illustrated on the right side in
Fig. 1. Nevertheless, pioneer works on incentive mechanism
(e.g., [16]) are static and offline, in which the concurrent pres-
ence of numerous smartphone candidates is required. These
offline schemes assume that all users will stay from the
very beginning of one round of task distribution for bidding
and cannot accept new bids afterwards (shown on the left
side in Fig. 1). In other words, the offline mechanisms all
fail in a more practical yet dynamic setting of mobile phone
sensing. We hence explore to devise a new thread of online
incentive mechanisms.
In this work, we will first design two online incentive
mechanisms based on online reverse auction: threshold-
based auction (TBA) and truthful online incentive mecha-
nism (TOIM). Then we extend TOIM to the non-zero
arrival-departure model and present the third mechanism
TOIM-AD. TBA is designed to pursue utility maximization,
while TOIM/TOIM-AD makes a tradeoff between utility
maximization and truthfulness. Simulation results validate
the desired properties of the mechanisms, reveal the impact
of the key parameters, and show good approximation to the
state-of-the-art offline mechanism.
The key contributions of our work are summarized in the
following:
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
on online incentive mechanism design for crowd-
sensing applications with smartphones, where the
platform does not have to synchronize large
amounts of users simultaneously while distribut-
ing tasks. The online attribute of the devised
mechanisms offers more flexibility in recruiting
opportunistically encountered participants and
holds potential for practical and large-scale mobile
sensing applications.
 We design three online incentive mechanisms: TBA,
TOIM and TOIM-AD. These mechanisms are com-
putationally efficient, individually rational, profit-
able and highly competitive. What’s more, TOIM
and TOIM-AD possess the essential property of
truthfulness.
 Extensive simulations have validated the viability of
the proposed incentive mechanisms and the analysis
of the key parameters gives guidance for tuning the
mechanisms to meet application requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
formulates the system model and problem. The proposed
online incentive mechanisms are described in Section 3.
Section 4 shows the performance of the proposed mecha-
nisms. Finally, Section 5 reviews related work and Section 6
concludes this paper.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Fig. 1 illustrates the typical interaction flow of both the off-
line and online settings in smartphone crowd-sensing sys-
tem. The system involves two participating roles: the
platform that distributes a sensing task and the mobile phone
users who constitute potential labor force. The objective is to
design a task assignment scheme which ensures both the
platform and the users are satisfied, i.e., their utility func-
tions are maximized. We elaborate the interaction proce-
dures under the two settings separately.
Fig. 1. Offline/online settings for smartphone crowdsourcing.
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In the offline setting (on the left side of Fig. 1), the plat-
form initiates one round of task distribution by sending
task descriptions. And a set of n users are assumed to be
interested in the sensing tasks after receiving the requests.
As the sensing task consumes their own resources of com-
putation, communication, and energy, the participating
users incur a cost. It is thus rational for each user to
expect certain profit based on her cost and sensing plan
(e.g., the sensing time). A participating user then submits
a bidding profile (including the bidding price and the sens-
ing plan) to the platform. The platform decides which
users to accept and offers the payments to the users after
collecting all bidding profiles from the n users. And the
paid users then perform the assigned tasks and return the
sensed data back to the platform.
Unlike the batched and synchronised manner in the off-
line setting, the interactive process in the online setting is
sequential and asynchronous. Before recruiting any users
for sensing tasks, the platform first decides the expected
number of participating users needed for a particular sens-
ing taskm. And it will recruit users within the first n apply-
ing users who are interested in the task. The key difference
is that the decision of the platform is made one by one upon
each user’s arrival in a random order. And each user leaves
immediately after one round of interactions with the plat-
form. The interactive procedures between the platform and
each of the potentially participating users is summarized as
follows (illustrated on the right side of Fig. 1):
 The platform sends the sensing task description to
mobile phone user who opportunistically steps into
the targeted sensing area.
 The user receives such a message. If she is not inter-
ested in the sensing task, she will simply ignore the
message; otherwise, she will submit a bidding profile
including the bidding price and sensing plan back to
the platform.
 The platform receives a bidding profile and has to
make an irrevocable decision regarding whether or
not to accept the bid and distribute a payment to the
accepted user.
 The chosen user conducts the assigned sensing tasks
and returns the corresponding data to the platform.
And this completes the interaction between one user
and the platform.
In the online setting, one round of task assignment fin-
ishes until the platform has recruited m users to perform
the sensing task. Note that in this setting, the number n
reflects the time requirement of completing the task, and
the recruit numberm helps to motivate users to compete for
winning the auction. Both parameters are given according
to the specific crowdsensing task requirement. In this set-
ting, we implicitly assume large amounts of users are will-
ing to participate, as the crowdsourced tasks are trivial for
smartphone users and can bring users profit [17], [18], [19],
[20]. Under this assumption, the incentive mechanism
works by controlling the interaction between the platform
and bidding users.
We interpret several key parameters in the above interac-
tion processes here. Typically, a bidding profile specifies a
user’s bidding price and sensing plan. The bidding price of a
user is the minimum price that she will accept for exchange
of her sensing effort. The price is a real value generated
according to the sensing plan. And the sensing plan is sce-
nario-specific. For instance, in [16], a sensing plan describes
a user’s willingness on how long she wants to involve in the
sensing task, i.e., the sensing time of each user. Another
example is provided in [17], where the task may contain
several assignments. The sensing plan thus shows how
many assignments a bidder is willing to take.
As previously discussed, the objective of the incentive
mechanism is to ensure both the platform and the users are
satisfied. And this is evaluated by their own utilities. Both
the platform and participating users are interested in pursu-
ing high utility. From the perspective of the platform, users’
sensing plans and the corresponding bid prices are input
for its strategy, and it evaluates its utility gained from a spe-
cific user before deciding whether to recruit and pay the
user or not. On the user’s side, she also evaluates her utility
based on the cost to conduct the assigned sensing task.
We mathematically formulate the incentive mechanism
problem for online smartphone crowdsensing in the subse-
quent section and the frequently used notations are summa-
rized in Table 1.
2.1 Mathematical Formulation
Assume that user i has a true cost of ci, and she bids at a
price bi when receiving the task message sent by the plat-
form. ci and bi are i.i.d. sampled from some unknown distri-
bution. We assume that users are coming to submit their
bids in a random order. If the platform accepts the bid of
user i, it determines a payment price pi, and adds user i to
the set T of winning users. Then the utility of user i is
~ui ¼ pi  ci; if i 2 T ;0; otherwise:

(1)
TABLE 1
Notations
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The expected utility of the platform is
u ¼   log 1þ vðT Þ

 
 bðT Þ; (2)
where vðT Þ ¼Pi2T yi and bðT Þ ¼Pi2T bi.
The log term in Equation (2) captures the platform’s
marginal diminishing return on selected users, which con-
forms to the usual economic assumption [21].  is a system
parameter that can control the gradient of the diminishing
return. yi is the value brought by user i to the platform.
The calculation of yi depends on specific applications. For
example, in [16], yi is evaluated through the sensing time
submitted by user i. And in [22], yi depends on the loca-
tions of user i through a coverage function. Note that the
actual payment given to user i may be greater than bi, i.e.,
pi  bi. To make the problem meaningful, we assume that
the platform can recruit at least one user i such that
uðfigÞ > 0.
As with Yang et al. [16], our objective is to design an
online incentive mechanism with the following four
properties:
 Computational efficiency. An online mechanism is
computationally efficient if it has a polynomial time
complexity.
 Individual rationality. A user will get nonnegative
utility upon completing the sensing task.
 Profitability. The platform will get nonnegative utility
at the end of the sensing task.
 Truthfulness. A mechanism is truthful, or incentive
compatible, if a bidder cannot improve her utility by
submitting a bidding price deviating from her true
value in spite of others’ bidding prices.
The first three properties guarantee the feasibility of the
incentive mechanism, while truthfulness makes the mecha-
nism free from market manipulation and encourages users
to reveal their true value. Note that we adopt these proper-
ties as they are essential in the sense of designing incentive
mechanisms, no matter in the online setting or in the offline
setting. In addition, we will examine the mechanisms with
one more property:
 Competitiveness. To evaluate the performance of the
mechanism considering utility maximization, we
compare its solution with the optimal solution in
the offline setting, where the platform has the full
knowledge of users’ bidding profiles. A mecha-
nism is OðgðnÞÞ-competitive if the ratio between
the online solution and the optimal offline solution
is OðgðnÞÞ.
3 ONLINE INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
In this section, we will develop three online incentive mech-
anisms, named TBA, TOIM, and TOIM-AD. These mecha-
nisms investigate the desirable properties of the incentives
from different perspectives. The basic idea of TBA is to use
the first batch of bidders as a reference set and make recruit-
ment decisions on the second batch of bidders. TBA puts
strength in maximizing the platform utility, which provides
a performance upperbound for TOIM and TOIM-AD. Based
on the structure of TBA, we design TOIM and TOIM-AD.
TOIM is a truthful online mechanism which is highly com-
petitive to the optimal solution in the zero arrival-departure
model; while TOIM-AD extends TOIM to the non-zero
arrival-departure model.
3.1 Threshold-Based Auction
First, we attempt to design an online auction-based incen-
tive mechanism maximizing the platform’s utility, which
is an online optimization problem. Babaioff et al. [23]
presented a framework based on generalized secretary
problems for online auctions, which could only achieve
approximation algorithms. In our problem, as the objective
function is more complex, the optimization is more diffi-
cult. We will resort to the property of submodularity in
developing the auction mechanism.
Definition 1 (Submodular Function). Given a groundset V, a
function f : 2V ! R is submodular if for any A  B  V,
and e 2 V, we have
fðA [ fegÞ  fðAÞ  fðB [ fegÞ  fðBÞ:
For the sake of simplicity, we denote fðA [ fegÞ ¼
fðA þ eÞ and feðAÞ ¼ fðA þ eÞ  fðAÞ.
Lemma 1. The platform utility u is submodular.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the supplementary file
of the paper, which can be found on the Computer Society
Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/
10.1109/TPDS.2013.2297112.
Having proved the submodularity of the utility function,
we would like to design an auction mechanism based on
the algorithm of [24]. However, the utility function u can be
negative, which does not meet the requirement of the algo-
rithm. To ensure the nonnegativity of the objective function,
we replace u with uþPi2Q bi to run the offline submodular
maximization algorithm, where
P
i2Q bi is a constant
obtained from the groundset Q. The nonnegativity comes
from the following direct intuition. Given any set T of
selected users, where T  Q, we have uþPi2Q bi 
uþPi2T bi ¼  logð1þ vðT Þ Þ  0. From the optimization
point of view, maximizing both objectives are equivalent.
And the discussion of competitiveness will be based on this
revised objective function.
We thus develop an online incentive mechanism called
threshold-based auction (TBA), as illustrated in Algo-
rithm 2. The first k users’ bidding profiles, as well as the
expected recruitment number m and the utility function
u, will be collected as input to run the offline submodular
maximization algorithm SubmodMaxCardinality (Algo-
rithm 1), which gives an estimate of the optimal value of
selecting m users. Specifically, the algorithm makes use of
two subroutines to generate several candidate sets and
returns the one with the largest utility (Lines 2 to 7). Each
subroutine takes Q as the groundset and the function
f ¼ uþPi2Q bi as the objective function. Subroutine
Greedy makes use of the greedy strategy to select m users,
while FMV2:5 applies a local search algorithm (the analy-
sis of these two subroutines are involved and we refer
interested users to [24], [25] for more detailed discussion).
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Given the set S of selected users, Lines 8 to 12 calculates
the marginal utility increment vector d ¼ ½d1; d2; . . . ; djSj by
greedily selecting the user with the largest marginal incre-
ment. d is further used to construct a marginal utility
threshold value with an approximate value ", which is
determined by the platform. The users having marginal
utilities above the threshold will be selected and be paid a
reward equalling their bidding prices, until the platform
has recruited the desired number of users.
Next we analyze the properties of TBA algorithm.
 Computational efficiency. In TBA algorithm, the while-
loop is of OðnÞ time complexity. On the other
hand, the function SubmodMaxCardinality is of
Oð1 n3m logmÞ time complexity [24]. Thus TBA can
be computed in polynomial time.
 Individual rationality. In TBA algorithm, the winning
users will be given payments equalling to their
claimed bids. As users are assumed to be selfish and
rational, their bids must be no less than their true
costs. Therefore, the users who are recruited will
have nonnegative profit.
 Profitability. Lines 6 and 7 of TBA algorithm assure
that the platform will have nonnegative marginal
utility when it recruits a user. So at the end of the
algorithm, the total utility of the platform is
nonnegative.
 Truthfulness. We use a simple example here to dem-
onstrate that TBA is untruthful. Suppose that we
want to select 2 users in the next 5 users. We have
calculated the marginal threshold vector opt ¼ d" ¼
½8; 6 from the observation of the previous users. And
the system parameter  ¼ 500. The set of winning
users is T ¼ f at the beginning. The value and bid
price of the users are listed in Table 2.
Assume that the users are bidding truthfully.
Since u1ðT Þ ¼  log ð1þ y1 Þ  b1 ¼ 11:28 > opt1 ¼ 8,
then TBA adds user 1 to the target set, i.e.,
T ¼ f1g. Next TBA calculates the marginal utility
obtained by adding user 2, u2ðT Þ ¼  logð1þ y1þy2 Þ
ðb1 þ b2Þ  uðT Þ ¼ 2:04<opt2 ¼ 6. User 2 is not
satisfied. TBA ignores user 2 and considers user 3.
Using the same procedure, we get u3ðT Þ ¼ 3:83
<opt2 and u4ðT Þ ¼ 8:61>opt2. Therefore, TBA
selects user 4 and the algorithm terminates.
Now assume that user 4 lies by bidding 4þ 
(Table 2b), where 0 <   2:61. The calculation for
the first 3 users are the same. For user 4, u04ðT Þ ¼
 logð1þ y1þy4 Þ   logð1þ y1 Þ  ð4þ Þ¼u4ðT Þ   
8:61 2:61 ¼ 6 ¼ opt2. Thus, user 4 is still qualified.
The platform selects user 4 and the payment is up to
6:61. In this case, user 4 increases her payment by
lying about her true cost, which demonstrates that
TBA is untruthful.
We summarize the competitiveness of TBA in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. TBA is Oð1"Þ-competitive.
Proof. Let T 	 be the best user set selected by the offline
submodular maximization algorithm SubmodMax
Cardinality with repsect to the entire candidate user set
U . The utility of T 	 is thus uðT 	Þ, which has been proved
to be Oð1Þ-competitive compared with the optimal solu-
tion [24]. Hence we only need to show that TBA has a
competitive ratio Oð1"Þ compared with uðT 	Þ. Then TBA
is also Oð1"Þ-competitive compared with the optimal
solution.
Let T 1 and T 2 be the subsets of T 	 that appear before
and after the cutoff value k ¼ n=2, respectively. The set
of users observed before cutoff value is denoted as T b.
Thus we have T 1 ¼ T 	 \ T b and T 2 ¼ T 	 \ fUnT bg.
Since the costs and values of users in U are independent
and identically distributed, they can be selected in T 	
with the same probability. Also, the sampled set T b is a
random subset of U as users come to submit their bids
in a random order. Therefore, the number of users from
T 	 in the set T b conforms to a hypergeometric distribu-
tion Hðn=2; jT 	j; nÞ. Hence we have E½jT 1j ¼
E½jT 2j ¼ jT 	j=2. The utility of each user can be seen as
an independent and identically distributed random
variable. Combining the submodularity of u, it can be
TABLE 2
An Example Showing the Untruthfulness of TBA
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derived that
E½uðT 1Þ ¼ E½uðT 2Þ  uðT 	Þ=2: (3)
On the other hand, when TBA goes to Line 3 and imple-
ments offline submodular maximization considering the
users that have been observed, it can obtain a best user
set T 0. Thus we have
E½uðT 0Þ  E½uðT 1Þ  uðT 	Þ=2: (4)
For an appropriate value of ", the platform can
recruit expected number of m users. Denote T as the
user set selected by TBA. Then after executing the
while loop from Lines 5 to 10, we accumulate m
inequalities and have
uðT Þ 
XjT j
t¼1
dt="  uðT 0Þ=": (5)
Combining inequalities (4) and (5) gives the result
E½uðT Þ  uðT 	Þ=2", which means that TBA mechanism
is Oð 1" Þ-competitive compared with the offline solution.tu
3.2 Truthful Online Incentive Mechanism
TBA algorithm aims at approximately maximizing the
platform’s utility by employing submodularity. However,
TBA is untruthful, which may encourage users to lie about
their true costs in order to get higher profit. On the other
hand, the sampling period ignores the first batch of users
before the cutoff number k (Line 3 of Algorithm 2), which
makes TBA algorithm less attractive, as in this setting, users
may tend to arrive later so that they can have more chances
to win the bidding. This may make the platform delay the
completion of the task or even starve as it cannot receive
any bids.
Considering these factors, we develop a truthful online
incentive mechanism (TOIM) which sacrifices some utility
while maintaining the essential truthfulness of the mecha-
nism as well as facilitating fast completion of the task.
TOIM is illustrated in Algorithm 3. Before the cutoff
number k (Lines 4 to 9), the algorithm lacks the guidance to
decide whether a user is good enough to recruit. The algo-
rithm maintains a set Q of bids that it has seen so far, and
accepts a new bid bi if bi < threshold, where threshold
 CalThresholdðQÞ. (CalThreshold calculates a statistical
value, e.g., the mean/median value, from the bids of the
observed users). Also, TOIM makes sure that the marginal
utility of the platform being nonnegative after the platform
pays to the selected user. In this phase, the platform
recruited l ¼ ba mc users, where a 2 ½0; 1=2Þ.
When the platform has encountered k users, TOIM uses
all the bids that it has seen so far to run an offline utility
maximization algorithm SubmodMaxCardinality (Line 10).
Based on the approximate optimal utility obtained from
SubmodMaxCardinality, TOIM gets a threshold marginal
utility increment vector as in TBA. Also TOIM sets a thresh-
old price that it is willing to pay a qualified user. Recall that
uiðT Þ ¼   logð1þ vðT þiÞ Þ    logð1þ vðT Þ Þ  bi, then the
actual marginal utility of user i is set uiðT Þ þ bi  threshold,
where threshold is the threshold price that the platform is
willing to pay the user. If this marginal utility is higher than
the threshold marginal utility, the platform will recruit her
(Line 14). The whole procedure of TOIM aims to obtain a
high utility of the platform while maintaining truthfulness.
Theorem 1 shows that the proposed TOIM algorithm is
truthful and satisfies other desirable properties.
Theorem 1. TOIM is computationally efficient, individually
rational, profitable and truthful.
Proof. To prove Theorem 1, we show that each property in
the theory holds.
Lemma 3. TOIM is computationally efficient.
In Algorithm 3, the running time of the two while-
loops is OðnÞ. On the other hand, the running time of
SubmodMaxCardinality is Oð1 n3m logmÞ. Thus Algo-
rithm 3 is computationally efficient.
Lemma 4. TOIM is individually rational.
Lemma 5. TOIM is profitable.
The proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5 are given in the supple-
mentary file, available online.
Lemma 6. TOIM is truthful.
Consider user i with cost ci who arrives at some
stage after the cutoff number k, for which the platform
is willing to pay p ¼ threshold. If by the time the user
submits a bid price bi, the platform has already selected
enough qualified users, the user can only get a payment
of zero and cannot benefit from reporting a false cost.
Otherwise, there is still room to recruit users by the
time user i arrives.
If ci  p, it won’t make any differences by submitting
a bid price smaller than p. User i will have utility equal-
ling to p ci  0 in this case. If the user submits a bid
price larger than p, TOIM will reject user i, and thus the
user receives a utility of zero.
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If ci > p, user i will not be selected by submitting a
bid price larger than p. If user i submits a bid smaller
than p, she will be selected. However, her utility will be
negative, which encourages her to submit a bid reflecting
her true cost.
Note that the above arguments also apply to the sce-
nario before the cutoff number k. In summary, TOIM is a
truthful online incentive mechanism. tu
Although TOIM scarifies platform utility for achieving
truthfulness, we next show that it’s still Oð1"Þ-competitive as
TBA.
Lemma 7. TOIM is Oð1"Þ-competitive.
Proof. The main arguments are the same as those proposed
in the proof of Lemma 2. The difference lies in that TOIM
pays a selected user based on a threshold value. At the
time of cutoff value, the recruited user set is T , with
jT j ¼ ba mc. Denote T c ¼ T . For the next selected user
i, we have
dj="  uiðT Þ  ðthreshold biÞ: (6)
Denote the user set returned by the offline submodular
maximization is T 0. Then summing all m ba mc
inequalities gives us
uðT 0Þ=" 
Xmbamc
j¼1
dj="
 uðT Þ  ððm ba mcÞ  threshold
X
i2T nT c
biÞ:
(7)
The first inequality comes from the fact that jT 0j ¼ m=2 
m ba mc, as we assume a 2 ½0; 1=2Þ. The righthand
side of the second inequality represents the actual utility
obtained by the platform after the cutoff value. Therefore,
combining inequalities (4) and (7) proves that TOIM is
Oð1"Þ-competitive comparedwith the offline solution. tu
3.3 Online Incentives for Arrival-Departure Model
In TBA and TOIM, we assume that users who participate
in the bidding process submit bids and leave immedi-
ately. We term this setting as zero arrival-departure
model, as the users arrive and depart at nearly the same
time. The setting is reasonable for the sensing applica-
tions where the decision has to be made in time. For
example, In LiFS [13], the users receive task description
when they enter the target building, and users make
immediate bidding profiles hoping the platform to reply
shortly, as they may not want to be disturbed anymore
when they are working or shopping in that building.
Nevertheless, in other settings, smartphone users may not
be in such a hurry, andmay stay connectedwith the platform
for some time interval. For example, a user who is staying in
a traffic tool or drinking at a coffee shop may play with the
platform for some time. In this setting, a user i has a true
value tuple ðai; di; ciÞ, where ai and di (ai  di) are her arrival
and departure time, and ci is the cost as demonstrated above.
Therefore, user iwill report a bidding profile ða0i; d0i; biÞ to the
platform in order to get a payment, with the constraint that
ai  a0i  d0i  di. Here we have assumed that a user cannot
report an earlier arrival time and a later departure time. The
designed mechanism needs to satisfy the desirable proper-
ties as in TOIM. In addition, the truthfulness of the mecha-
nism now includes two aspects: cost-truthfulness and time-
truthfulness. In other words, the mechanism should be able
to make users report their true arrival and departure time as
well as the sensing cost.
Algorithm 4 sketches the procedure of the truthful online
incentive mechanism for general arrival-departure model
(TOIM-AD). As can be seen, the basic logic structure is the
same as TOIM. The difference lies in that, at each time step
t, there may be several candidate users instead of one as in
TOIM. Denote the online set as O, which includes the bid-
ding users who haven’t left at t. T is the set of selected
users. Some users may be included into T before they
depart. Therefore, the recruit strategy is to greedily select
users from O0  OnT , who meet the marginal utility con-
straints. And the selected users are paid the threshold pay-
ment when they depart. The desired properties of TOIM-
AD are summarized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. TOIM-AD is computationally efficient, individually
rational, profitable, truthful.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it suffices to prove each of
the four properties is satisfied. Note that TOIM-AD
uses the same recruit conditions and payment scheme
as TOIM. Lemmas 4 and 5 have shown that TOIM is
individually rational and profitable. Therefore, TOIM-
AD is also individually rational and profitable. Con-
sidering the computational efficiency, we notice that
the only difference of TOIM-AD and TOIM is that at
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each time step t, TOIM-AD needs to do OðnÞ compari-
sons in the inner while-loop. Therefore the running
time of the nested while-loop is Oðn2Þ. Again the com-
putation time is limited by the offline maximization
algorithm. Hence TOIM-AD is computationally effi-
cient as TOIM. Based on the above discussion, we
only need to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8. TOIM-AD is cost-truthful and time-truthful.
The proof of Lemma 8 is given in the supplementary
file of the paper, available online. tu
The competitiveness of TOIM-AD is the same as TOIM,
as the user selection rules and the marginal utility increment
thresholds are constructed in the same manner. Therefore,
we can summarize the utility maximization performance of
TOIM-AD as the following lemma.
Lemma 9. TOIM-AD is Oð 1" Þ-competitive.
Remark. The proposed TOIM/TOIM-AD algorithm
still works and preserves the above desired properties
when different computable submodular utility functions
are adopted. Thus TOIM/TOIM-AD can be adapted to
diverse applications.
4 SIMULATIONS
In this section, we conduct thorough simulations to investi-
gate the performance of the proposed algorithms. Note that
TOIM and TOIM-AD have the same expected performance,
we only use TOIM in the simulation to compare with TBA.
To serve as a baseline, we also design a naive greedy algo-
rithm, i.e., given the random sequence of the applying users,
the system determines to accept a bid if the marginal utility
is greater than zero, until it has recruited the expected num-
ber of users.
In TBA and TOIM, there are three common key parame-
ters: the total number of potential users n, the expected
recruitment number of users m, and the approximation
ratio ". We will explore the effect of these parameters
respectively.
Simulation setup. The value and cost of each user is uni-
formly distributed over ½1; 10 and ½1; 5, respectively. We set
three controlled groups of the above parameters as follows:
 set A ¼ fn ¼ ½100 : 100 : 1000;m ¼ 40;a ¼ 0:3;  ¼
800; " ¼ 2g
 set B ¼ fm ¼ ½20 : 20 : 200; n ¼ 2000;a ¼ 0:3;  ¼
800; " ¼ 2g
 set C ¼ f" ¼ ½1:1 : 0:05 : 1:6; n ¼ 2000;m ¼ 40;a ¼
0:3;  ¼ 500g,
where x ¼ ½x1 : x2 : x3 means that the value of x is varied
from x1 to x3 with the increment of x2. The evaluation for
each parameter set is averaged over 100 instances.
4.1 The Effect of n
Parameter set A is adopted for evaluating the parameter n,
which reflects the time restriction of the system. Given that
the users are coming around the sensing task area ran-
domly, the system may collect the statistics about the fre-
quency of the occurrence of users. Therefore, if a sensing
application has certain time restrictions, the system may
predicts the required number of candidate users. Fig. 2
shows that, when the system is expecting to recruit m ¼ 40
users, the utility of the system changes according to the total
number of candidate users. As can be shown in the figure,
when there are more candidate users the proposed TBA
and TOIM can choose, the utility of the system increases
accordingly. The results are satisfied as the more users there
are, the more knowledge our algorithms can get before they
make decisions. The curves of the proposed algorithms
become flat with the increase of candidate population after
n ¼ 300. The intuition is that, for a fixed number of expected
users, after observing sufficient number of users, the addi-
tional observation can help to improve the utility less. On
the other hand, The naive algorithm doesn’t gain improve-
ments with the increment of the user population at all, as it
doesn’t learn about the bidding behavior of users and make
simple greedy choices.
4.2 The Effect ofm
The parameter m is an indication of workload for a specific
sensing application. We use parameter set B to verify the
effect of changing m. Fig. 3 depicts that, given a fixed num-
ber of candidate users, how the utility will respond to the
variation of m. As can be seen from the figure, the marginal
increment by recruiting more users is decreasing, which
conforms to the expected property of submodular utility
objective functions. In other words, for a given number of
candidate users, the platform will converge to and reach the
maximum utility after recruiting sufficiently large number
of users.
4.3 Competitiveness
To investigate the competitiveness of the proposed online
mechanisms intuitively, we compare TBA and TOIM with
the LSB auction mechanism [16] with parameter set C. LSB
approximately maximizes the platform utility in the offline
setting and thus is an appropriate upperbound of online
mechanisms.
Fig. 3. The effect ofmFig. 2. The effect of n
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Fig. 4 shows the utility ratios of three online algorithms
to LSB with respect to ". As can be seen from the figure, the
curves of TBA/LSB and TOIM/LSB increase with the incre-
ment of " at first, and then they decrease with the increment
of ". The reason is that, when the value of " is too small,
TBA and TOIM tend to aggressively choose the users with
utility close to the offline marginal utility increment, which
may hardly be met on the course of the algorithms. As a
result, insufficient number of users can be recruited in the
end (Fig. 5) and the platform utility is thus unsatisfied.
When " is large enough such that TBA and TOIM are able
to recruit the expected number of users, the utility ratios
decrease with the increment of ". The trends of the curves
reflect the influence of approximation ratio ". Also, The
highest ratios of TBA/LSB and TOIM/LSB are 90.9 and
71.6 percent, respectively, both of which are much higher
than the ratio obtained by the naive greedy algorithm.
5 RELATED WORK
Despite many existing smartphone sensing applications,
there are few research works dealing with incentive mecha-
nisms. In [26], Reddy et al. enabled the system to pick well-
suited participants for sensing services by developing
recruitment frameworks. However, their frameworks are
not yet incentive mechanisms as they can only select users,
rather than motivate users to participate. Danezis et al. con-
sidered motivating users by proposing a sealed-bid sec-
ond-price auction in [27]. However, they didn’t take
platform utility into account when designing the auction.
Lee and Hoh designed a reverse auction based dynamic
price incentive mechanism in [28], where users claim their
bid prices at which they are willing to sell the sensed data
to the service provider. However, the essential property of
truthfulness in mechanism design was not considered. In
[29], Duan et al. analyzed and compared different incentive
mechanisms that can be used by a client to motivate the col-
laboration of smartphone users on both data acquisition
and distributed computing. Koutsopoulos [30] proposed
an incentive mechanism to minimize the total cost of com-
pensating participants, given the quality constraint of sens-
ing tasks, while Zhao et al. [31] tried to maximize the
platform value given the cost constraint . In [16], Yang et al.
proposed a different model that integrate platform value
and cost, and designed two incentive mechanisms from
platform-centric and user-centric perspectives. Based on
some utility functions, they presented a Stackelberg Game
based approach for the platform-centric model and a
reverse auction-based incentive mechanism for the user-
centric model. Our proposed problem extends their model
to the online setting, where we do not assume large
amounts of users bidding at the same time. Instead, we
accommodate the temporal dynamics of mobile users and
designmore flexible and efficient mechanisms. On the other
hand, the aspect of submodular function maximization of
this paper is inspired by [24], where Gupta et al. designed
constant-competitive approximation algorithms for non-
monotone submodular functions.
Incentive mechanisms are also studied in other network-
ing problems [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]. However, all of these
works are tailored to meet the unique characteristics of the
studied problems, thus they cannot be applied to the smart-
phone sensing problem as stated in this work.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have designed three online incentive
mechanisms for smartphone sensing applications based
on online reverse auction. TBA intends to approximately
maximize the utility of the platform, while TOIM/TOIM-
AD makes a tradeoff between maximizing utility and
maintaining the essential property of truthfulness. The
designed mechanisms are computationally efficient, indi-
vidually rational for each participant, and profitable for
the platform. Also, the mechanisms are highly competi-
tive compared to the optimal solution. Simulation results
show the influence of different parameters and good
approximation performance compared to the state-of-art
offline counterpart. In the future work, we will further
explore the competitiveness of the mechanisms. Also, we
will investigate more involved incentive mechanisms that
can differentiate user quality.
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